Boom and Bubble Blog

An analysis of US economic trends and their relations with world development dynamics

Saturday, October 25, 2008

10/25/08 Could the Us emerge more powerful from the financial mess?

one outline of the world, post-financial mess, begins to show a resemblance with
the recession of 1981-82. during that previous period of recession, the monetarist
policies of Volker's Fed pushed up interest rates on the dollar to unprecedented
levels, approaching 18%. Volker's policies were aimed to break the pressure of
stagflation, high inflation and stagnant output, on profit rates which in turn,
threatened the dollar's preeminent role in global economies.
certainly, today's dollar interest rates of 1.5% speak to a completely different
fed approach to econ unstability. but in both cases we see a radical strengthening
of the dollar. in the first case, as a result of record high interest rates and in
the second due to a global panic rush to the perceived relative safety of the
dollar.
Contrary to some progressive evaluations, this strengthening of the dollar could
greatly increase us power as the greatest pain is felt in collapsing emerging
markets around the globe, decimated by outflows of foreign investment. the us
economy, the undisputed locus of the crisis, would appear positioned to emerge from
the crisis in a better position than before the mess, able to take advantage of the
crisis situation in the developing world. strengthened american banks and their
industrial clients, can expect to profit greatly from the wreckage of foreign
economies.
the developing world and europe must extract some punishment of the us economy and
the dollar should be the target. the imf must support emerging market currencies
without preconditions in most cases.

Thursday, October 09, 2008

AIG - the failings of the repo market

AIG Bailout Hit by New Cash Woes
Fed Moves to Widen Available Loans to Near $123 Billion
By LIAM PLEVEN, SUDEEP REDDY and CARRICK MOLLENKAMPOctober 9, 2008; Page A1
The federal government said Wednesday it would lend American International Group Inc. as much as another $37.8 billion, a sign that its initial $85 billion effort to shore up the company is coming up short.
The move, which comes less than a month after the Federal Reserve agreed to bail out the giant insurer, raises questions about whether the government will need to keep injecting money into the troubled company. So far, the Fed has agreed to make nearly $123 billion available to AIG.
The government's original plan was that the initial loan would allow AIG to meet its obligations as they came due, buying it time to sell assets. The proceeds of those sales would be used to pay back the loan. As of Oct. 1, AIG had drawn down $61 billion. The Federal Reserve is expected to indicate Thursday the latest borrowing figure. AIG hasn't yet announced any significant asset sales.
The government's deepening involvement underscores its view that a failure of AIG could have devastating consequences for the global financial system. The government has a major interest in the fate of the company, because it took an 80% ownership stake in exchange for extending the original loan. Now, it is effectively loaning money to itself to keep its own insurance company afloat.
"How could this company have gotten itself into a position where it is reliant on the government for almost $125 billion of liquidity funding?" asks David Havens, a credit analyst at UBS. "Eighty-five billion was breath-taking."
An AIG spokesman said that "it's just an extraordinary situation in the markets." He added that the new plan "is part of our effort to arrive at an overall solution." He said it is designed to help the company avoid needing to borrow the full $85 billion, and that it was not a sign that the initial plan was faltering.
MORE

Fed statement on AIG loans
Copy of the letter from Liddy to Paulson
Copy of the letter from lawmakers to Paulson
The Fed action comes during a week in which the government has taken unusually aggressive steps to revive global markets, from lending directly to nonfinancial corporations to participating in a world-wide coordinated interest-rate cut. The government already is facing considerable risk from its seizure of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and its $700 billion program to take troubled assets off the books of financial firms.
The terms of the latest injection show how far AIG's problems extend beyond losses stemming from complex credit derivatives, which helped lead to the company's downfall. AIG now faces extensive losses from a program that involves securities held by highly regulated units that sell life insurance policies.
The new plan is aimed at easing the strains from that program, under which AIG lent out securities to third parties, and received collateral in return. That program is costing AIG dearly, because it had invested some of that collateral in other assets, including mortgage-backed securities. Some of those assets lost value.
When the borrowers of the securities returned them, and asked for their money back, AIG had to make up the difference out of pocket, putting further strains on its coffers. Some trading partners were unwilling to keep borrowing securities from AIG, so the company was unable to lend them back out for fresh collateral. The Fed is essentially offering to be that borrower: it will take up to $37.8 billion worth of securities from AIG, and give the company cash in return.
When the Fed devised the initial $85 billion loan program, it didn't anticipate that financial conditions would deteriorate as much as they have in recent weeks, with key credit markets freezing for a wide range of businesses. The market turmoil put additional funding pressure on AIG's regulated subsidiaries, which are the safest piece of the AIG portfolio.
With the latest move, the Fed is trying to buy the company more time to sell assets, which it hopes will increase the ultimate value of its 80% stake. The Fed did not expect asset sales to happen immediately; the initial loan had a two-year term.
The Fed considers the transactions in the new lending program to be relatively low-risk. The securities are highly rated investment-grade debt that state regulators allow insurers to invest in. The Fed will apply its normal "haircuts," taking some percentage off the collateral value to protect against losses. The lending also will be backed by assets of the regulated insurance subsidiaries, which weren't included in the original loan.
Such securities-lending woes are not limited to AIG. Other insurance companies and institutional investors, including pension and mutual funds, have similar programs designed to allow them to squeeze out a few extra bucks by lending out the securities in their portfolios. But the recent turmoil in the credit markets has turned some of the programs, which have long been reliable money makers, into money losers.
At the end of June, AIG owed securities borrowers $75.1 billion for collateral it had taken in, while the value of the collateral reinvested was $59.5 billion, according to a company filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Since then, the credit crunch has worsened.
The Fed now finds itself in a tricky political position with AIG. Few if any lawmakers and aides knew how quickly much of the $85 billion had been tapped, and they were not given much warning of the Fed's latest move. They displayed frustration at a congressional hearing Tuesday, where they grilled two former AIG chief executives.
The bailout bill enacted last week requires the Fed to quickly report to top lawmakers when it invokes the authority it used to extend the new money. As a result, the central bank will likely face questions about what limits there might be on future money.
Meanwhile, federal prosecutors are looking back at the events that put the company into such a precarious position. A federal probe started earlier this year is looking into whether AIG executives misled investors about financial products that helped cause the company's downfall, and whether executives misled AIG's outside auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, according to a person close to the matter.
Congressional testimony about the firm's collapse showed that AIG may have prevented its own internal auditor from examining how it was valuing credit-default swaps, which are contracts linked to subprime mortgages, and other debt that led AIG to take several multi-billion-dollar write-downs. The company has said it is cooperating with the investigations by the Justice Department and Securities and Exchange Commission.
AIG's risks extend around the globe. It had a big business helping European banks significantly decrease the amount of capital they had to set aside to cushion against losses. According to AIG's most recent annual report, filed in February, the company issued credit protection for more than $300 billion of corporate loans and residential mortgages, the bulk of which was issued for European financial institutions. Daniel Gros, director of the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, estimates that banks would have to find some $25 billion in fresh capital to counter an AIG default.
--Damian Paletta and Amir Efrati contributed to this article.
Write to Liam Pleven at liam.pleven@wsj.com, Sudeep Reddy at sudeep.reddy@wsj.com and Carrick Mollenkamp at carrick.mollenkamp@wsj.com

our assets are distressed, finding a bottom - Oct 9

How much is my house worth? - pt2.

Certainly the market does play the social role of ratifying the value of an asset,
such as my home, through the measure of price. but as we can see in the current
financial mess, the market might cease to function for all practical purposes for
some assets. Looking at the demand side, we see that deleveraging is freezing the
lending of credit, which during the bubble in home prices has supplemented the flat
incomes of americans. A sharp rise in income disparity between the rich, siphoning
off the tributary of profits from financial leverage, and the rest of us has skewed
the valuing process for essential assets such as our homes. rebalancing income
disparity and reducing an over-reliance on credit is essential to discovering a
price of our homes which is more reflective of what we value as a society.

What effect will the bailout and other Treasury-Fed interventions have on the
discovery of a price for troubled assets?

Freudians will recognize the similarity of our orphaned troubled assets and the
role of repression in the operations of our psyche. We need to keep hidden that for
which we cannot find a sustainable value or interpretation. Our experience remains
hidden away, undigestable and forever private and uncomfortably provactive until it
can find its social meassure. Similarly, our overleveraged, bloated mortage-based
securities can not be left to the social valuing of the market without fear of
peering deeply upon the truths our economic lives structured upon the greed of
wall-street casino financing for over a decade. Our fathers, Greenspan, Rubin, the
ceos of wall street have let us down. Can we resolve our oedipal complex?

finding a bottom
the deus ex machina of the economy has been the panoply of leverage techinques
twinned with the supposed protections of varied versions of derivative insurance.
this army of enablers, the repo market, swaps, asset backed securities, sivs, even
commercial paper, all have ceased to function any longer to support the endless
needs of leveraged credit. the high-water mark of valuations on the stock market
was a year ago today, with the dow hitting 14000, since then the waters have
subsided 37% to our current mark of 8600. cash has fled to the side-lines of
government secured deposits and debt. with treasuries now providing insignificant
returns in exchange for their security, it can be expected that with the first
signs of the credit freeze beginning to thaw, cash will forsake the negligible rate
of treasuries for equities. treasuries can be expected then to fall sharply as
confidence returns to the stock market, this will spur the treasury to sell even
larger amounts of bills to service the debt, causing rising interest rates and
still greater push against the price of government debt. the dollar should then
come under pressure in relation to other currencies.

Saturday, October 04, 2008

The end of Fannie and Freddie - Oct 4 NY Times

When the mortgage giant Fannie Mae recruited Daniel H. Mudd, he told a friend he wanted to work for an altruistic business. Already a decorated marine and a successful executive, he wanted to be a role model to his four children — just as his father, the television journalist Roger Mudd, had been to him.
Fannie, a government-sponsored company, had long helped Americans get cheaper home loans by serving as a powerful middleman, buying mortgages from lenders and banks and then holding or reselling them to Wall Street investors. This allowed banks to make even more loans — expanding the pool of homeowners and permitting Fannie to ring up handsome profits along the way.
But by the time Mr. Mudd became Fannie’s chief executive in 2004, his company was under siege. Competitors were snatching lucrative parts of its business. Congress was demanding that Mr. Mudd help steer more loans to low-income borrowers. Lenders were threatening to sell directly to Wall Street unless Fannie bought a bigger chunk of their riskiest loans.
So Mr. Mudd made a fateful choice. Disregarding warnings from his managers that lenders were making too many loans that would never be repaid, he steered Fannie into more treacherous corners of the mortgage market, according to executives.
For a time, that decision proved profitable. In the end, it nearly destroyed the company and threatened to drag down the housing market and the economy.
Dozens of interviews, most from people who requested anonymity to avoid legal repercussions, offer an inside account of the critical juncture when Fannie Mae’s new chief executive, under pressure from Wall Street firms, Congress and company shareholders, took additional risks that pushed his company, and, in turn, a large part of the nation’s financial health, to the brink.
Between 2005 and 2008, Fannie purchased or guaranteed at least $270 billion in loans to risky borrowers — more than three times as much as in all its earlier years combined, according to company filings and industry data.
“We didn’t really know what we were buying,” said Marc Gott, a former director in Fannie’s loan servicing department. “This system was designed for plain vanilla loans, and we were trying to push chocolate sundaes through the gears.”
Last month, the White House was forced to orchestrate a $200 billion rescue of Fannie and its corporate cousin, Freddie Mac. On Sept. 26, the companies disclosed that federal prosecutors and the Securities and Exchange Commission were investigating potential accounting and governance problems.
Mr. Mudd said in an interview that he responded as best he could given the company’s challenges, and worked to balance risks prudently.
“Fannie Mae faced the danger that the market would pass us by,” he said. “We were afraid that lenders would be selling products we weren’t buying and Congress would feel like we weren’t fulfilling our mission. The market was changing, and it’s our job to buy loans, so we had to change as well.”
Dealing With Risk
When Mr. Mudd arrived at Fannie eight years ago, it was beginning a dramatic expansion that, at its peak, had it buying 40 percent of all domestic mortgages.
Just two decades earlier, Fannie had been on the brink of bankruptcy. But chief executives like Franklin D. Raines and the chief financial officer J. Timothy Howard built it into a financial juggernaut by aiming at new markets.
Fannie never actually made loans. It was essentially a mortgage insurance company, buying mortgages, keeping some but reselling most to investors and, for a fee, promising to pay off a loan if the borrower defaulted. The only real danger was that the company might guarantee questionable mortgages and lose out when large numbers of borrowers walked away from their obligations.
So Fannie constructed a vast network of computer programs and mathematical formulas that analyzed its millions of daily transactions and ranked borrowers according to their risk.
Those computer programs seemingly turned Fannie into a divining rod, capable of separating pools of similar-seeming borrowers into safe and risky bets. The riskier the loan, the more Fannie charged to handle it. In theory, those high fees would offset any losses.
With that self-assurance, the company announced in 2000 that it would buy $2 trillion in loans from low-income, minority and risky borrowers by 2010.
All this helped supercharge Fannie’s stock price and rewarded top executives with tens of millions of dollars. Mr. Raines received about $90 million between 1998 and 2004, while Mr. Howard was paid about $30.8 million, according to regulators. Mr. Mudd collected more than $10 million in his first four years at Fannie.
Whenever competitors asked Congress to rein in the company, lawmakers were besieged with letters and phone calls from angry constituents, some orchestrated by Fannie itself. One automated phone call warned voters: “Your congressman is trying to make mortgages more expensive. Ask him why he opposes the American dream of home ownership.”
The ripple effect of Fannie’s plunge into riskier lending was profound. Fannie’s stamp of approval made shunned borrowers and complex loans more acceptable to other lenders, particularly small and less sophisticated banks.
Between 2001 and 2004, the overall subprime mortgage market — loans to the riskiest borrowers — grew from $160 billion to $540 billion, according to Inside Mortgage Finance, a trade publication. Communities were inundated with billboards and fliers from subprime companies offering to help almost anyone buy a home.
Within a few years of Mr. Mudd’s arrival, Fannie was the most powerful mortgage company on earth.
Then it began to crumble.
Regulators, spurred by the revelation of a wide-ranging accounting fraud at Freddie, began scrutinizing Fannie’s books. In 2004 they accused Fannie of fraudulently concealing expenses to make its profits look bigger.
Mr. Howard and Mr. Raines resigned. Mr. Mudd was quickly promoted to the top spot.
But the company he inherited was becoming a shadow of its former self.
‘You Need Us’
Shortly after he became chief executive, Mr. Mudd traveled to the California offices of Angelo R. Mozilo, the head of Countrywide Financial, then the nation’s largest mortgage lender. Fannie had a longstanding and lucrative relationship with Countrywide, which sold more loans to Fannie than anyone else.
But at that meeting, Mr. Mozilo, a butcher’s son who had almost single-handedly built Countrywide into a financial powerhouse, threatened to upend their partnership unless Fannie started buying Countrywide’s riskier loans.
Mr. Mozilo, who did not return telephone calls seeking comment, told Mr. Mudd that Countrywide had other options. For example, Wall Street had recently jumped into the market for risky mortgages. Firms like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs had started bundling home loans and selling them to investors — bypassing Fannie and dealing with Countrywide directly.
“You’re becoming irrelevant,” Mr. Mozilo told Mr. Mudd, according to two people with knowledge of the meeting who requested anonymity because the talks were confidential. In the previous year, Fannie had already lost 56 percent of its loan-reselling business to Wall Street and other competitors.
“You need us more than we need you,” Mr. Mozilo said, “and if you don’t take these loans, you’ll find you can lose much more.”
Then Mr. Mozilo offered everyone a breath mint.
Investors were also pressuring Mr. Mudd to take greater risks.
On one occasion, a hedge fund manager telephoned a senior Fannie executive to complain that the company was not taking enough gambles in chasing profits.
“Are you stupid or blind?” the investor roared, according to someone who heard the call, but requested anonymity. “Your job is to make me money!”
Capitol Hill bore down on Mr. Mudd as well. The same year he took the top position, regulators sharply increased Fannie’s affordable-housing goals. Democratic lawmakers demanded that the company buy more loans that had been made to low-income and minority homebuyers.
“When homes are doubling in price in every six years and incomes are increasing by a mere one percent per year, Fannie’s mission is of paramount importance,” Senator Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat, lectured Mr. Mudd at a Congressional hearing in 2006. “In fact, Fannie and Freddie can do more, a lot more.”
But Fannie’s computer systems could not fully analyze many of the risky loans that customers, investors and lawmakers wanted Mr. Mudd to buy. Many of them — like balloon-rate mortgages or mortgages that did not require paperwork — were so new that dangerous bets could not be identified, according to company executives.
Even so, Fannie began buying huge numbers of riskier loans.
In one meeting, according to two people present, Mr. Mudd told employees to “get aggressive on risk-taking, or get out of the company.”
In the interview, Mr. Mudd said he did not recall that conversation and that he always stressed taking only prudent risks.
Employees, however, say they got a different message.
“Everybody understood that we were now buying loans that we would have previously rejected, and that the models were telling us that we were charging way too little,” said a former senior Fannie executive. “But our mandate was to stay relevant and to serve low-income borrowers. So that’s what we did.”
Between 2005 and 2007, the company’s acquisitions of mortgages with down payments of less than 10 percent almost tripled. As the market for risky loans soared to $1 trillion, Fannie expanded in white-hot real estate areas like California and Florida.
For two years, Mr. Mudd operated without a permanent chief risk officer to guard against unhealthy hazards. When Enrico Dallavecchia was hired for that position in 2006, he told Mr. Mudd that the company should be charging more to handle risky loans.
In the following months to come, Mr. Dallavecchia warned that some markets were becoming overheated and argued that a housing bubble had formed, according to a person with knowledge of the conversations. But many of the warnings were rebuffed.
Mr. Mudd told Mr. Dallavecchia that the market, shareholders and Congress all thought the companies should be taking more risks, not fewer, according to a person who observed the conversation. “Who am I supposed to fight with first?” Mr. Mudd asked.
In the interview, Mr. Mudd said he never made those comments. Mr. Dallavecchia was among those whom Mr. Mudd forced out of the company during a reorganization in August.
Mr. Mudd added that it was almost impossible during most of his tenure to see trouble on the horizon, because Fannie interacts with lenders rather than borrowers, which creates a delay in recognizing market conditions.
He said Fannie sought to balance market demands prudently against internal standards, that executives always sought to avoid unwise risks, and that Fannie bought far fewer troublesome loans than many other financial institutions. Mr. Mudd said he heeded many warnings from his executives and that Fannie refused to buy many risky loans, regardless of outside pressures .
“You’re dealing with massive amounts of information that flow in over months,” he said. “You almost never have an ‘Oh, my God’ moment. Even now, most of the loans we bought are doing fine.”
But, of course, that moment of truth did arrive. In the middle of last year it became clear that millions of borrowers would stop paying their mortgages. For Fannie, this raised the terrifying prospect of paying billions of dollars to honor its guarantees.
Sustained by Government
Had Fannie been a private entity, its comeuppance might have happened a year ago. But the White House, Wall Street and Capitol Hill were more concerned about the trillions of dollars in other loans that were poisoning financial institutions and banks.
Lawmakers, particularly Democrats, leaned on Fannie and Freddie to buy and hold those troubled debts, hoping that removing them from the system would help the economy recover. The companies, eager to regain market share and buy what they thought were undervalued loans, rushed to comply.
The White House also pitched in. James B. Lockhart, the chief regulator of Fannie and Freddie, adjusted the companies’ lending standards so they could purchase as much as $40 billion in new subprime loans. Some in Congress praised the move.
“I’m not worried about Fannie and Freddie’s health, I’m worried that they won’t do enough to help out the economy,” the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts, said at the time. “That’s why I’ve supported them all these years — so that they can help at a time like this.”
But earlier this year, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. grew concerned about Fannie’s and Freddie’s stability. He sent a deputy, Robert K. Steel, a former colleague from his time at Goldman Sachs, to speak with Mr. Mudd and his counterpart at Freddie.
Mr. Steel’s orders, according to several people, were to get commitments from the companies to raise more money as a cushion against all the new loans. But when he met with the firms, Mr. Steel made few demands and seemed unfamiliar with Fannie’s and Freddie’s operations, according to someone who attended the discussions.
Rather than getting firm commitments, Mr. Steel struck handshake deals without deadlines.
That misstep would become obvious over the coming months. Although Fannie raised $7.4 billion, Freddie never raised any additional money.
Mr. Steel, who left the Treasury Department over the summer to head Wachovia bank, disputed that he had failed in his handling of the companies, and said he was proud of his work .
As the housing crisis worsened, Fannie and Freddie announced larger losses, and shares continued falling.
In July, Mr. Paulson asked Congress for authority to take over Fannie and Freddie, though he said he hoped never to use it. “If you’ve got a bazooka and people know you’ve got it, you may not have to take it out,” he told Congress.
Mr. Mudd called Treasury weekly. He offered to resign, to replace his board, to sell stock, and to raise debt. “We’ll sign in blood anything you want,” he told a Treasury official, according to someone with knowledge of the conversations.
But, according to that person, Mr. Mudd told Treasury that those options would work only if government officials publicly clarified whether they intended to take over Fannie. Otherwise, potential investors would refuse to buy the stock for fear of being wiped out.
“There were other options on the table short of a takeover,” Mr. Mudd said. But as long as Treasury refused to disclose its goals, it was impossible for the company to act, according to people close to Fannie.
Then, last month, Mr. Mudd was instructed to report to Mr. Lockhart’s office. Mr. Paulson told Mr. Mudd that he could either agree to a takeover or have one forced upon him.
“This is the right thing to do for the economy,” Mr. Paulson said, according to two people with knowledge of the talks. “We can’t take any more risks.”
Freddie was given the same message. Less than 48 hours later, Mr. Lockhart and Mr. Paulson ended Fannie and Freddie’s independence, with up to $200 billion in taxpayer money to replenish the companies’ coffers.
The move failed to stanch a spreading panic in the financial world. In fact, some analysts say, the takeover accelerated the hysteria by signaling that no company, no matter how large, was strong enough to withstand the losses stemming from troubled loans.
Within weeks, Lehman Brothers was forced to declare bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch was pushed into the arms of Bank of America, and the government stepped in to bail out the insurance giant the American International Group.
Today, Mr. Paulson is scrambling to carry out a $700 billion plan to bail out the financial sector, while Mr. Lockhart effectively runs Fannie and Freddie.
Mr. Raines and Mr. Howard, who kept most of their millions, are living well. Mr. Raines has improved his golf game. Mr. Howard divides his time between large homes outside Washington and Cancun, Mexico, where his staff is learning how to cook American meals.
But Mr. Mudd, who lost millions of dollars as the company’s stock declined and had his severance revoked after the company was seized, often travels to New York for job interviews. He recalled that one of his sons recently asked him why he had been fired.
“Sometimes things don’t work out, no matter how hard you try,” he replied.

Depression the result of insufficient credit not available capital - Bubble Bulletin 10/4/8



Here at home, our maladjusted economic system will only be sustained by somewhere in the neighborhood of $2.0 TN of new Credit. It’s simply not going to happen. The $700bn from Washington would seem like an enormous amount of support. In reality, it’s nowhere even close to the amount necessary for systemic stabilization. To the $2.0 TN or so of new Credit required this year (and next) add perhaps as much as several Trillion more necessary to accommodate speculative de-leveraging (liquidations forced by huge losses). Importantly, the Bust in Wall Street Finance has ensured that insufficient liquidity will be forthcoming to maintain inflated asset prices and sustain the Bubble economy – creating catastrophe for the leveraged speculating community.

The “Freidmanites” thought they understood the (post-crash) policy mistakes that led to The Great Depression. They believed the “Roaring Twenties” was the “Golden Age of Capitalism.” The great bust could have been avoided with a simple ($5bn or so) banking system recapitalization. As we are witnessing today, the issue is not some manageable amount of new “capital” to replenish banking system losses. Instead, the predicament is the massive and unmanageable amount of new Credit necessary to, on the one hand, sustain a mal-adjusted Bubble Economy and, on the other, the Trillions more required to accommodate a gigantic speculative de-leveraging. I have a very difficult time seeing a way out of this terrible mess.